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1. Introduction
The isotopic correlation technique
(ICT) is based on the fundamental physics
principle that the isotopic compositions of
nuclear material in fuel cycle systems con-
tain information regarding the design and
history of nuclear material flow from fuel
fabrication, reactor operation, and through
input to the reprocessing plant. Isotopic
Correlation in conjunction with the gravime-
tric (or Pu/U) method for mass determination
can be developed to provide an independent
in-field verification of the reprocessing
input accountancy at the dissolver and/or
accountancy stage of the reprocessing plant.
The use of fission product and/or heavy
element isotopic ratios for verifying mass
input to reprocessing plants jhâ e been ex-
plored by many investigations.
The Argonne National Laboratory program
in isotope correlation techniques is based
on three-dimensional reactor physics calcul-
ations of characteristic geometries/composi-
tion in each reactor class. The ANL/ICT
methodology has been implemented for the
analysis of the ESARDA reprocessing input
verification (RIV) working group's benchmark
exercise.
The ESARDA exercise to test the perfor-
mance of ICT procedures has been outlined
and reported by Messr. A. Giacotnetti. The
benchmark exercise was organized using re-
processing data from the La Hague plant and
the reactor data from the Obrigheim power
plant operation. These data consisted of
mixed batches of Obrigheim assemblies, total
and partial assemblies with various initial
enrichments, reprocessed at the COGEMA faci-
lity. The data were divided into two
groups: Set A, containing 2H batches, serv-
ed as the reference data; Set B, containing
29 batches, included intentional anomalies
in a fraction of the batches. Set B was to
test the ability of the methodology to as-
certain anomalies in the reprocessing data.
The overall results of the exercise is being
planned by the RIV working group for a fu-
ture presentation.
This paper presents only the DOE/ANL
study effort in developing the Isotopic
correlation technique analysis and diagnos-
tic algorithms as a contribution to the
ESARDA benchmark exercise.
2. ESARDA Single-Correlation Analysis
2.1. Plutonium and Uranium Analysis
Algorithm
The plutonium and uranium mass deter-
minations are based on a three-factor formu-
lation involving the Pu/U ratio, a correla-
tion relating Pu/U with the quantity
(U+Pu)/Uo, and the fabricators specification
of the initial uranium mass Uo:
Pu/U
The Pu/U ratio is either the value measured
by the reprocessor or a value derived from
isotope correlations. The two principle
ICT-derived Pu/U ratios employed in these
initial analyses are: one, from the measur-
ed U-235 weight percent using correlation
11, Dep (U-235) (w/o) vs. Pu/U (g/fcg);
and two, from the measured Pu-239 weight
percent using correlation
#2, (100 - Pu-239) (w/o) vs. Pu/U
(g/kg).
The algorithm produces both the plutcnium
and uranium masses that "are actually" in
the tank if the Pu/U ratio is measured by
the reprocessor or inspector and the masses
that "should-be" in the tank if the ?u/'J
ratio is derived from correlations. The
first factor identifies the mass value to i>e
determined; that is,
actually is" in the
«asured Pu/U ratio,
a. the mass that
tank for the
and
b. the mass that "should-be" in the
tank for the ICT-derived Pu/U ratio.
The second factor is computed fr«n the cor-
relation relating (U»Pu)/Uo to the Vv/U
ratio used in the first factor. The third
factor is the fabricator's specification of
the total initial uranium content for the
assemblies in the batch. The equation for
the uranium nass is analogous, with a 1
replacing the Pu/U in the numerator of the
first factor.
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2.2 Intermittent Irradiation
The analysis identified anomalies in
the irradiation histories of many assembl-
ies; with some assemblies being irradiated
for one or two cycles, withdrawn from the
configuration for as many as three cycles,
and subsequently reinserted for additional
burn cycles. First-order correction fac-
tors, independent of specific fuel cycle
parameters, were computed to correct the
isotopics and Pu/U ratio for this effect.
The correction factors ranged from 0.3> to
3.0J for the Pu/U ratio. The correction
improves the agreement between the measure-
ment-derived and ICT-derived mass determina-
tions for the entire campaign and reduces
the overall uncertainty. The correction
factors are dependent only upon the number
of cycles for which the assembly was removed
and not upon the specific fuel cycle num-
bers. These generic corrections are incor-
porated into the diagnostic system.
2.3 Single-Correlation Analysis
The analysis of the ESARDA Set A and
Set B data using the single correlation
scheme are presented both with and without
corrections for intermittent irradiation.
Correlation II and #2 used for the analysis
are the calculated theoretical enrichment-
dependant correlations modified by the
ESARDA Set A data with intermittent irradia-
tion corrections included.
2.3.1 Discussion of Set A Analysis: A
typical suaoary table output for the single
correlation analysis is presented in Table I
for correlation #1 with intermittent
irradiacion corrections. The campaign aver-
aged percent difference in the plutoniun
masses determined froo the measurement-der-
ived Pu/U ratio and frcio the TCT-derived
PJ/'J ratio obtained fro« the measured U-235
isotcpics as listed in the table is (-0.02
«•/- l."4)J for correlation t^ with intermit-
tent irradiation correction included. !f
the corrections were omitted, the difference
in plutoniun BUSS determination would be
(O.S4 •/- 1.59JJ for correlation I*. The
effect of intermittent irradiation correc-
tions are shown in Figure 1 for the 3.10?
enrichment batcnes of Sec A, where open
diamonds represent the data without correc-
tion and the crosses, the data with correc-
tion. The correction effected a reduction
in the spread of the reprocessing data and
deviation from the reference correlation
curve. The results for correlations #1 and
#2, with (w) and without (w/o) ineeraittent
irradiation (II) corrections on plutoniias
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2.3.2 Discussion of Set B Analysis: The
single correlation analysis of Set B data
with the intentional anomalies included and
for correlation #1 and #2 with intermittent
irradiation corrections are summarised be-
low. The campaign average p«rcent differen-
ces in the plutonium sass determined from
the aeasuresent-derived and ICT-derive<J Pu/U
ratios are:
(2.30 ./- 1.86)% for correlation #1
(2.62 »/- 1.46); for correlation 12
A pronounced increase in the percent differ-
ence !i*t»-p»n the aeasureaent-derived and
:CT-deriv<ri piutoniua Bass determination was
cbs«r:ed for both correlation between Set A
and Set B riaS,-». These differences reflect
an apparent t.ias in the Pu/U ratio of about
2-3J between the batches in Set A and Set
B. The source of this bias was determined
to be the introduction of Mixed-oxide fuel
assemblies in the loading configurations.
Set A assemblies, mainly irradiated in later
power cycles with significant numbers of HOX
assemblies; Set B assesblies « e irradiated
in earlier power cycles having few, if any,
HOX assemblies. Scoping calculations veri-
fied that the presence of MOX fuel assembl-
ies would produce a bias qualitatively con-
sistent with the observed discrepancy be-
tween Set A ana Set B. Consequently the
REPRODUCED FROM BEST
AVAILABLE COPY
analysis is to bs performed with isotopic
correlations adjusted for the MOX loading
configuration.
2.3.3 U-236 Initial Concentration: For
both Set A and Set B of the reprocessing
data, the correlation between U-235 and
U-236 reveals a definite systematic under-
predietion of the U-236 weight percent, as
identified in the U-235 vs. U-236 correla-
tion. For the 3.10J enrichment batches in
Set A, the magnitude of this bias is 0.0172
+/- 0.0011 w/o; for the 3.10? enrichment
batches in Set B, the bias is 0.0186 +/-
0.0009 u/o. The isotopic correlation analy-
sis identifies l-hat the source of this bias
is an initial concentration of U-236 in the
uranium fuels. Analysis of the compositions
of the uranium fuels used in the ZPR criti-
cal facilities at ANL corroborates this
concentration level. The U-235 and U-236
weight percents for six uranium oxide or
metallic fuels, spanning nearly the complete
range of enrichments, represent a dependence
of U-236 concentration on uranium enrich-
ment. Interpolation of this fitted cu:-ve
yields a U-236 concentration of 0.0272 w/o
at 3-10J enrichment. The value is in agree-
ment with the U-236 bias in the reprocessing
data.
3. ESARSA Diagnostic Analysis
3.1 Diagnostic ICT Analysis
Two aspects of the ANL/ICT diagnostics
methodology are (1) to analyze anomalies in
the dynamics of isotope production through
detail reactor physics computations and (2)
to evaluate internal consistency in batch
reprocessir.g data and to identify and quan-
tify any inconsistency. This use of reactor
physics computations as diagnostic tools
resolved the apparent anomalies in the re-
processing data of the ESARDA exercise. The
apparent anomalies were correctly modeled in
the deviation and application of the correl-
ations. This feature could be employed
after-the-fact to diagnose apparent anoma-
lies discovered in reprocessing data or
before-the-ract to predict the sensitivity
of ICT to potential anomalies. Results from
predictive computations indicate additional
safeguards objectives that can be achieved
with isotope correlations.
The single-correlation aethod of cass
determination based on a limited number of
primary correlations, such as correlations
*1 and #2, does not evaluate the consistency
among the isotopic and Pu/U reprocessing
data or to estimate the plutonium and uran-
ium masses based on the complete set of
measured isotcpics. A diagnostic analysis
algorithm has been developed to incorporate
these capabilities in the ANL/ICT method.
Based upon isotopic correlations deriv-
ed from detailed reactor calculations and
adjusted with reliable historic data, this
algorithm examines seven measured quanti-
ties: U-235, U-236, Pu-239, Pu-2«0, Pu-241,
Pu-242, and Pu/U, each in relation to the
other six. The results of these forty-two
comparisons are evaluated to determine in-
consistencies among the seven quantities and
to provide a single, unified ICT-derived
Pu/U ratio for mass determinations via the
three-factor formula.
Statistical parameters are establish
for each correlation characteristic devia-
tions which are to be expected from consis-
tent batch reprocessing data and therefore
deviation thresholds which, if significantly
exceeded, indicate potential anomalous data.
Two statistical parameters are required for
the diagnostic implementation: the mean and
standard deviation for the distribution of
deviations of the reference data from each
adjusted correlations, both quantities being
expr«ssed in weight percent for the isotop-
ics and in gm'kg for the Pu/U ratio.
3.2 Diagnostic Algorithm
The algorithms have been developed to
evaluate in a unified manner the measured
data against the complete set of diagnostic
correlations. One aspect of this evaluation
is to investigate the internal consistency
of the reprocessir.g data, that is, to exam-
ine the isotopics and Pu/U ratio applying
all of the correlations in order to detect
syster-atic deviations which portend anoma-
lies in the data. k second aspect is to
utilize all of the measured isotopics ir.
order to ascertain the best estimate of the
plutonium and uranium trasses. This approach
decreases the overall uncertainty in the
estimated masses and reduces the potential
for biases introduced by aass determinations
reliant on a single isotopic weight percent.
The diagnostic algorithm is structured
to compute- the deviations of the reprocess-
ing data from the set or adjusted correla-
tions, to determine batch enrichment anoma-
lies, to diagnose isotopic and Pu/U ratio
outliers, and to determine the plutonium and
uranium masses for the measured and ICT-
derived Pu/U ratios.
. ESARDA Diagnostic Analysis Results
1.1 Discussion of Intentional Anomalies
The initial application of diagnostic
routine was the analysis of the ESARDA Set 3
reprocessing data. Eleven of the twenty-
nine batches in this data set had been in-
tentionally modified to provide a means to
compare the diagnostic capabilities of var-
ious ICT methods in the reprocessing commun-
ity. Referring to Table II, there were
three categories of anomalies introduced'
1. misstated assembly burnup,
(batches: 11, 26)
computed estimates of the mass content based
on ICT-derived Pu/U ratios consistent with
non-suspect isotopics and hence without the
intentional anomalies.
1.3
2. misstated assembly content of batch, and
(batches: 3, 8, 21, 29)
3. misstated isotopics and/or Pu/U ratio.
(batches: 6, 12, 1H, 17, 18,27)
The misstatement of the burnup occurred
either alone (batch 26) or in conjunction
with a misstatement of the Pu/U ratio (batch
11). The misstatement of the assemblies
constituting the batch manifested itself
through erroneous values in other quanti-
ties, such as, initial enrichment, effective
bixnup, decay correction factors, and inter-
mittent irradiation factors.
U.2 Diagnostics of Intentional Anomalies
Table II, summarizes the intentional
anomalies for the eleven modified batches
and also identifies and quantifies the anom-
alies detected by the diagnostic analysis
scheme. Anomalies in U-231 and Pu-238 were
not deducect since these Isotopics were not
included among the indices in the diagnostic
routine. The only anomaly not resolved was
a O.»t w/o modification to Pu-239, with a
nominal concentration of 60 w/o, in batch
12. Since the A.'JL nethoci does not utilize
assembly burnup in any phase of its isotopic
correlation analysis, the diagnostics schene
does not recognize a aisstatCT.ent of burnup
as anomaly; that is, the method diagnoses
ancrraiies in the measured quantities without
rec-irmg an accurate estimate of the calcu-
lated burnup, as shown in baton 1fJ.
The rightmost column in the Taole II,
signifies the difference in the deduced
anoaaly froa the intended value in units of
standard deviation of the uncertainty in the
deduced anomaly. The magnitude of the de-
duced anomaly considers the deviation of the
modified data frco the correlation; the
statistical error in the data before the
anomaly was introduced is a component of
this difference. Errors associated with the
diagnostic scheme yield another component.
Since statistical uncertainties for the
reprocessing data were not specified, the
contributions to the difference from these
sources cannot be estimated.
Referring to Table I!I, large percent
differences (-31 ?) exist between the mea-
surement-derived and ICT-derived Fu/U ratio
ar.d Bass determinations for batches 3 TJ and
E27. The reason for this is that Vr.e mea-
surea data contained large intentional anom-
alies in tne Pu/U ratio which were detected
ey the diagnostic analysis; the diagnostics
1.1 Diagnostic Methodology
The ANL diagnostic methodology provides
an ICT-derived mass content that "should-be"
in the tank and identifies and quantifies
anomalies which may result from the inten-
tional falsification of reprocessing data,
measurement errors and biases, off-normal
power reactor and/or reprocessing plant
operations, and fabricators initial uranium
specifications.
5• Summary
The isotopic correlation technique
analysis and diagnostic algorithms have been
developed at Argonne National Laboratory for
implementation on mainframe and personal
computer systems. The analysis and diagnos-
tic software has the capability to incorpor-
ate facility-dependent features and can be
inpienented for infield and/or onsite in-
spectorate activities. The implementation
of the A!JL/!CT system for the ESAROA exer-
cise has demonstrated that ICT can be used
as an independent verification for determin-
ing the mass input to the reprocessing plant
and as an instrument for diagnosing anoma-
lies in the fuel cycle from fabrication,
power reactor and reprocessing plant opera-
tions, and in measured reprocessing data.
The aspects of the ESARDA study were:
• the identification of abnormal power
reactor operating procedures, the inter-
JI it tent irradiation of assemblies, which
yielded apparent anomalous data and the
erfect of physics-based correction fac-
tors;
• the discovery of an unintentional bias of
2-1/1$ between the single correlation
analysis of Set A, the reference data and
the identical analysis of Set 3, the test
data;
• the resolution of the source of an appar-
ent bias, using ICT diagnostic reactor
physics computations, as being the pres-
ence of partial aixtd-oxide loadings
during the irradiation of the reprocessed
assemblies;
the successful detection of the anomalies
intentionally introduced into the Set B
reprocessing data to evaluate ICT diag-
nostic capabilities; and
the improvement, using the diagnostic
analysis, in the agreement between the
ICT-derived and measurercent-derived mass
determinations for Set B on the batch
basis.
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Table I. Mass Determination and Pu/U Ratio by ANL/ICT Method
COGEHA Reprocessing Input Mass Verification
Obrlgheim PUR Spent Fuel Assemblies
Set A Data, at Reprocessing
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Table II. Evaluation of Diagnostic Analysis Results
























































































































(a) Anomalies in U-234 and Pu-238 not included in diagnostic algorithm.
(b) Anomaly undetected by diagnostics.
Table III. Mass Determination and Pu/U Ratio by ANL/ICT Method
COGEMA Reprocessing Input Mass Verification
Obrigheim PWR Spent Fuel Assemblies
Set B Data, at Reprocessing
Diagnostic Analysis
Batch
Label
B 01
B 02
B 03
B 0"
B 05
B 06
B 07
B 08
B 09
B 10
B 11
B 12
B 13
B 14
B 15
B 16
B 17
B 18
B 19
B 20
B 21
B 22
B 23
B 24
B 25
B 26 .
B 27
B 28
B 29
Campaign
PU/U
Meas
Pu/U
8.095
8.147
8.288
8.211
8.256
8.304
8.249
8.385
8.605
8.140
8.122
8.178
8.305
8.672
8.180
8.211
8.223
8.237
8.129
8.223
8.258
8.066
8.307
8.785
8.588
8.363
8.569
8.403
8.554
i Average -
I Uncertainty
Ratio (
1CT
Pu/U
8.216
8.235
8.274
8.273
8.243
8.369
8.211
8.396
8.716
8.142
8.154
8.140
8.413
8.392
8.168
8.336
8.229
8.152
8.136
8.201
8.220
8.033
£.377
8.660
8.439
8.284
8.241
8.342
8.504
Rm/k(?)
DIFF
(?)
1.49
1.08
-.17
.76
-.15
.78
-.46
.13
1.29
.02
.40
-.46
.131
-3.23
-.15
1.52
.07
-1.03
.09
-.27
-.46
-.41
.84
-1.42
-1.74
-.94
-3.83
-.72
-59
-.22
+/-1.23
Meas
Pu/U
4531.6
2281.3
4511.1
4597.0
4515.9
4439.5
4372.1
4455.6
4533.6
4367.7
4326.5
4341.0
4427.3
3465.4
5474.9
4374.4
4404.0
6544.5
6476.3
6562.5
4429.8
5394.5
5535.3
5812.0-
5691-3
5569.2
5698.3
5589.5
3413.1
Pu Mass («m)
ICT
Pu/U
4595.6
2304.7
4503.8
4630.0
4509.4
4472.2
t353.2
4461.1
4588.5
4368.5
4342.9
4322.0
4481.9
3359.7
5467.1
4437.5
4407.1
6480.4
6481.7
6546.0
4410.5
5373.4
5579.2
5734.1
5597.8
5519.5
5491.4
5551.2
3394.3
• / -
DIFF
(J)
1.41
1.03
-.16
.72
-.15
.74
-.43
.12
1.21
.02
.38
-.44
1.23
-3.05
-.14
1.44
.07
-.98
.08
-.25
-.44
-.39
.79
-1.34
-1,64
-.89
-3.63
-.69
-.55
-.20
1.16
